Wolterstorff ; see also Stump 48—49; Timpe Yet this prominent Integrationist line has been strongly criticized by other philosophers of religion, who implicitly endorse some version of the Contrast view, on which philosophy cannot legitimately appeal to theological sources of evidence like revelation and Church authority Simmons ; Schellenberg ; Oppy ; Draper 2—4.
At the same time, according to many Christian theologians, analytic philosophy as such is almost uniquely unsuitable for investigating properly theological questions Milbank ; Hart — On the view of these critics, analytic philosophical theology does not revive the Patristic integration of philosophy and theology at all; rather, it remains a distinctly anti-theological form of modern philosophy.
Contemporary philosophers and theologians continue to debate the proper relationship between philosophy and theology. Before considering these debates in further detail in Section 3 , however, it is useful to briefly survey recent work in analytic philosophical theology. The fact that the Integrationist view has been so prominent among contemporary analytic philosophers of religion has helped shape a philosophical climate in which self-identified philosophers, working in departments of philosophy, find it completely natural to investigate explicitly Christian theological questions, from within the framework of normative Christian orthodoxy, in the course of their academic work.
Recent work in analytic philosophical theology has engaged with nearly every major Christian doctrine. This section lays out the most significant philosophical problems associated with each doctrine and identifies some of the foundational philosophical responses from contemporary thinkers.
In the traditional terminology, the Father, Son, and Spirit are three distinct divine persons personae in Latin; hypostases in Greek who share a single divine nature substantia in Latin; ousia in Greek; see Tanner 5, 24, Responses to the logical problem can be grouped into several families, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.
Social trinitarians attempt to secure the divine unity by arguing that a single divine nature can support three separate consciousnesses. They may also claim that the three persons necessarily love each other so perfectly and act in such harmony that they are properly regarded as a single God. On Latin trinitarianism, even though the Father, Son, and Spirit are numerically distinct persons , they are not numerically distinct divine agents. When they act, they do not merely act in perfect harmony as on social trinitarianism.
Rather they are somehow a single actor, with a single will, carrying out a single action. The special challenge for Latin trinitarianism is to explain how it can be the case that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so construed, really do exist as concrete, distinct entities, and are not just different names for the same entity, or different phases in the life of a not-essentially triune God.
Brian Leftow offers the most well-developed Latin model, which appeals to an extended analogy to a time-travelling chorus-line dancer Unsurprisingly, the sharpest critics of Latin trinitarianism are those who advocate a social trinity, and vice-versa: each side insists that the theoretical costs of the opposing view are too great. Philosophical responses to the logical problem of the Trinity do not divide exhaustively into social models and Latin models.
According to constitution theorists, a lump of bronze can constitute a statue without being identical to it, since we can destroy the statue by melting it down without destroying the bronze. The sharpest criticism of relative identity accounts of the Trinity takes aim at the underlying notion that identity is kind-relative in the relevant sense. Similarly, the sharpest criticism of constitution views expresses doubts about the cogency and usefulness of the metaphysics of constitution Merricks Williams By the close of the fourth century, the early Church had agreed that God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, is no less divine than God the Father.
But this Trinitarian settlement led directly to another, equally vexing question: how could Jesus of Nazareth, a human man, also be identical to God the Son?
After another period of intense debate, the Church defined the doctrine of the Incarnation, which asserts that Christ is one person or one hypostasis who exists in two natures, one fully human, the other fully divine Tanner 83; Kelly — Yet, as with the doctrine of the Trinity, on its own, this conciliar terminology does not attempt to solve the underlying philosophical problem.
As Richard Cross puts it:. Cross In other words, the fundamental philosophical problem of Christology is the problem that arises when a single subject bears incompatible properties. Christ seems to be both necessarily omniscient, as the divine Son, the second person of the Trinity, and yet also limited in knowledge, as the human man, Jesus of Nazareth—and so on for other divine and human attributes.
Yet Christ is one person, not two: he just is the divine Son and he just is Jesus of Nazareth. On standard interpretations of logical consistency, nothing can have logically incompatible properties at the same time and in the same respect—hence the problem. More simply: Christ qua human is limited in knowledge; Christ qua divine is omniscient. The thought of Thomas Aquinas furnishes a foundational source for this solution Summa Theologiae 3.
Thomas Senor forcefully argues that this grammatical solution does not work, for it cannot block the relevant entailment: since the one Christ really is human and really is divine, it follows that the one Christ is also limited in knowledge qua human and omniscient qua divine , and so the contradiction remains Senor ; see also Morris Kenotic Christologies hold that at the point of incarnation, in order to become a human being, God the Son relinquished the divine attributes Forrest ; Evans , In a way, the kenotic option neatly solves the problem of incompatible properties, since Christ is not omnipotent and omniscient etc.
Kenotic Christologies have a venerable pedigree, as well as some clear Biblical warrant Philippians 2; for discussion see Evans ; McGuckin [ ]. But if omnipotence and omniscience are essential divine attributes, then it is not possible for God the Son to relinquish them during the incarnation and regain them after the incarnation while remaining self-identical. According to Thomas V. Morris, Christ is composed of the divine mind of God the Son, a human mind, and a human body.
On his telling, Christ counts as fully divine, because he has a divine mind, which is the seat of his omnipotence and omniscience; he also counts as fully human because he has a human mind and a human body Morris Morris denies that human beings as such are essentially limited in power and knowledge etc.
This move clears the way for attributing omnipotence and omniscience etc. Richard Swinburne defends a similar Christology, but according to Swinburne, Christ is composed only of God the Son and a human body, which together constitute both a human way of thinking and acting and also a divine way of thinking and acting. If God the Son has human parts and divine parts, then perhaps the whole mereological composite can borrow properties from its constituent parts without violating the law of non-contradiction.
Analogously, we might say that an apple is both colored and not colored, since it is red colored with respect to its skin, but white not colored with respect to its flesh. There is a sense in which the apple as a whole is both colored and not colored because it borrows properties from its parts.
Perhaps something similar can be said about Christ, understood as a mereological composite of God the Son, a human body, and a human soul. Leading advocates of this sort of view include Brian Leftow , and Eleonore Stump In fact, according to Pawl, once we correctly understand their truth conditions, we can see that they can both be true of the same subject after all.
Because Christ, and only Christ so far as we know has two natures, only Christ can be both omniscient and limited in knowledge. But it is importantly different: Pawl is content to affirm the very entailments e.
Beall goes a step further and argues that some predicates really are both true and false of Christ, because Christ really is a contradictory being , Beall defends a contradictory Christology because he accepts a non-standard model of logic, one on which some predicates can be neither true nor false of a subject, and other predicates can be both true and false of a subject. According to Beall, logic as such—that is, his favored account of logic—is neutral about whether any given substantive theory contains true contradictions.
When we examine the axioms of orthodox Christology, according to Beall, we find that they include authoritative conciliar statements that are most naturally read as contradictory—e. Rather than revise or reinterpret such statements so that they are not contradictory, we should accept that they are.
Arguably, the deepest and most fundamental Christian affirmation is that Christ saves. Unlike the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, however, the early Church never formally defined a single orthodox account of exactly how Christ saves or what it is about his life, death, and resurrection that accomplishes that saving work.
As a result, a variety of theories or models of atonement have proliferated throughout the centuries. Contemporary work in analytic philosophical theology typically builds on these models, reformulates them in contemporary language, and seeks to defend them from criticism.
Satisfaction models argue that as a result of their sinfulness, human beings have a debt or obligation to God that they cannot possibly repay. By becoming incarnate, living a sinless life, and voluntarily dying for the sake of humanity, Christ successfully discharges the debts and obligations that human beings owe to God.
Closely related to satisfaction models, penal substitution models claim that human beings deserve punishment from God as a result of their sinfulness. Christ saves by freely agreeing to be punished in their place. Satisfaction and penal substitution theorists must explain why a perfectly merciful God would require satisfaction or punishment from human beings at all, and why a perfectly just God would allow an innocent person to play the required role Porter Accordingly, satisfaction and penal substitution views have been heavily criticized by modern and contemporary theologians for depicting God as a petty, wrathful tyrant.
More recently, feminist theologians and philosophers have criticized satisfaction and penal substitution views for valorizing suffering Brown and Parker Christ on the cross mind-reads—that is, psychically experiences—the mental states of every human sinner. Sinful human beings are thereby united to Christ, and so to God. When the indwelling Holy Spirit leads sinners to respond to Christ with love, they also will what God wills.
Several other models, also prominent in the Patristic and medieval tradition, have so far received little attention from analytic philosophers of religion.
Jacobs and Mosser are important exceptions. Quinn offers a highly qualified defense, but holds that Christ is more than just a moral exemplar. The doctrine of sin and the doctrine of atonement are correlative in the same way that a disease and its remedy are correlative.
If sin is that from which Christ saves us, then the strength of the remedy atonement must vary according the severity of the disease sin. As a first approximation, a sinful act can be thought of as a morally bad act for which the sinner is responsible. Like other Christian doctrines, the doctrine of sin poses tricky philosophical problems.
To see those problems more clearly, it is useful to disambiguate the doctrine of sin into several distinct components: the first sin, the Fall, original sin, and personal sin. For extended discussion, see the entry sin in Christian thought.
The problem of the first sin is the problem of how the very first sinful act is even possible, given various Christian axioms about the goodness and creative power of God, and various philosophical assumptions about the nature of freedom and moral responsibility. The problem of the first sin is sometimes treated as a question about the fall of Satan. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to explain how Satan—by hypothesis, an angel created by God with a rational intellect, an upright will, and wholly good desires and dispositions—could ever make the sinful choice to reject God.
Contemporary philosophers who try to improve on their efforts include Barnwell , , MacDonald , Rogers , and Timpe The biblical story of Adam and Eve Genesis 3 recounts the story of the first human sin and its consequences. The traditional story of the fall of Adam and Eve does not seem consistent with either an evolutionary account of human origins or what we know about human history more generally.
On some understandings, questions about the historicity of the Fall are not properly philosophical questions at all. Yet it does seem like a properly philosophical task to articulate a doctrine of the fall that is both internally consistent and consistent with other things we know to be true.
Moreover, the doctrine of the Fall is conceptually connected to other aspects of the doctrine of sin as well as to the doctrine of salvation. Peter van Inwagen presents an account of the Fall that maintains many of its most important elements and, he claims, is consistent with evolutionary theory.
Despite initial impressions, neither van Inwagen nor Hudson are really concerned with defending quasi-literal readings of Genesis. Instead, they want to show that objections to those readings presuppose highly contestable philosophical—rather than empirical or scientific—assumptions.
On some stronger interpretations, all subsequent human beings are also justly regarded as guilty by God from birth, even before they have sinned themselves. Even apart from worries about the historicity of the fall, the philosophical challenges posed by this doctrine are obvious. How can people living now be morally responsible for the sins of the first human beings? If it is inevitable that all human beings will sin, can God justly punish them?
Some Christian philosophers have simply rejected the stronger versions of the doctrine of original sin as incoherent. Swinburne, for instance, denies that all human beings are born guilty as a result of the sin of their first parents and argues that the condition of original sin only makes it very likely, rather than inevitable, that they will sin themselves — Philosophy as a conscious activity then mostly consists in uncovering, analysing, and criticising these implicit conceptions.
Philosophy in this vein is the activity of searching out our preconceptions, to question our presuppositions, and to engage in careful and logical discussions about them. The goal is basically to become slightly less blinkered or foolish, if not quite wise.
Obviously, most people are not philosophers in this sense: although it is something anyone could do, at least anyone who is able to think about what they are usually thinking, and to articulate these thoughts.
If we take philosophy to be an academic discipline, however, governed by certain standards, lorded over by a small group of powerful people mostly men who decide what counts as philosophy in the first place, then anyone who has the inclination and the means to play along in the game can become a philosopher. Even a Masters in Library Sciences would give an incredible boost to her job prospects. And comments like this :. If you have any other options in your life that you feel would be personally rewarding or satisfying and they are things you can pursue then it will probably be good for you to pursue those instead of philosophy.
No, seriously. It only gets worse after grad school, in my experience. And even if you DO avoid rejection your paper is accepted to a conference! It gets published! You even write a book! For a representative sample of quotes, I created this list. My perception is that philosophers regard a career in philosophy much more negatively than how other professionals regard their profession. For more, see our full career profile on philosophy PhDs.
Home Blog I want to make a difference. The ideal structure of a society? Philosophers spend their lives attempting to answer questions like these. A taste for intellectual debate is a must in this profession. If you enjoy abstractions, you'll probably enjoy being a philosopher, but be warned: It's a tough way to pay the rent.
Most philosophers make their livings as college professors see Professor , but there aren't many full-time teaching positions in philosophy, and philosophers do not have outside employment opportunities the way engineers or economists do.
The French government has occasionally employed its own philosophers, once hiring noted philosopher Michel Foucault to serve on a committee to rewrite the French penal code, but the U. For those who do find teaching positions in philosophy, the work is quite similar to that of other professors in the humanities. Aside from teaching responsibilities, which usually occupy approximately twelve hours per week, one's time is largely one's own.
Professors stay busy, however; long hours are the norm, but the work is a pleasure if you enjoy reading and writing about philosophy, and why else would you enter the field? Particularly in the first few years, philosophy involves a lot of writing, as a young philosophy professor's publishing record is an important part of the tenure evaluation. Once tenured, however, philosophers can probably live the closest approximation of a life of pure contemplation in our society.
You can become a philosopher simply by deciding to call yourself one.
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